Clinical-trial cohort identification with AI agents
AI agents can screen trial populations and propose candidates with evidence. The eligibility determination stays a named investigator gate, on record.
Read →Insights
Plain-language writing on segregation of duties, sign-off, and the audit evidence a regulator can verify for themselves, for the people who have to answer for what a machine decided.
AI agents can screen trial populations and propose candidates with evidence. The eligibility determination stays a named investigator gate, on record.
Read →AI agents can run the benefits investigation and draft the appeal. Attesting eligibility, enrolling, and submitting stay a named human gate, on record.
Read →Part 11 governs electronic records and signatures. When an AI agent makes the record, here is what a control plane must provide to keep it defensible.
Read →AI agents can draft queries, propose medical coding, and reconcile clinical trial data, but decisions that change the trial record stay a signed human call.
Read →An AI agent can triage a vaccine temperature excursion and run the stability assessment. It cannot release the stock. That line is the control.
Read →An AI agent can triage complaints for FDA medical device reporting. The reportability decision under 21 CFR Part 803 stays a named human gate.
Read →AI agents can assemble the batch-disposition case, deviations, results, reconciliation. The Qualified Person still signs the release. Here is the line.
Read →AI agents can draft rebate, chargeback and government-price calculations from the ERP. A named reviewer still signs the figure that feeds Medicaid rebate and 340B reporting. Here is the line.
Read →AI agents can intake, deduplicate and triage device complaints and route the reportable ones, while reportability and closure stay named human gates.
Read →AI agents can structure adverse-event cases to ICH E2B and triage volume, but seriousness and causality must stay a qualified human gate, on record.
Read →An AI agent can assemble and quality-check an eCTD dossier. A regulatory-affairs lead still signs the release. Versioned and Part 11-defensible.
Read →The cost of writing code has collapsed, and with it the defensive value of hiding it. The advantage that remains is operations and trust, and openness strengthens both.
Read →Before shipping an AI agent into regulated work, verify six things: identity, deny-by-default grants, segregation of duties, human gates, limits, and audit.
Read →Guardrails ask if content is dangerous. Governance asks if the actor is authorized. An agent can pass every check and still release a batch on its own.
Read →Least privilege for agents means versioned grants held by a role, so you can reconstruct exactly what an agent could do on any past date, and who signed off.
Read →Agent pilots stall because nobody can answer for what the agent did. Accountability, not speed, is the blocker, and it is fixable.
Read →An examiner asks four things of an agent: what was it permitted to do, who granted that, who approved each decision, is the record intact. How to answer.
Read →Approval gates as first-class workflow steps: the run parks at the one-way door until a named human signs, quorums, requester exclusion, captured reason.
Read →The oldest control in healthcare and pharma, applied to machines: enforce maker-checker structurally at runtime, so the same agent cannot prepare and approve.
Read →Why regulated teams run agent governance in their own environment: data never leaves, it works air-gapped, nothing phones home, the audit evidence is yours.
Read →A SIEM log or trace shows what happened. It does not prove the record was not altered. The difference is what an auditor and a court accept as evidence.
Read →Four-eyes means a second named person, not a second model, signs the work. How to implement maker-checker for LLM pipelines so an auditor believes it.
Read →A control plane governs what AI agents are allowed to do, identity, grants, segregation of duties, approval gates, and audit, separate from the agent itself.
Read →Maker-checker is the control where one party prepares work and another approves it. Pharma and quality ran it for decades. Now it governs AI agents.
Read →Accountability does not transfer to a model. Named principals, human gates on the decisions that matter, and a record tying every action to who authorized it.
Read →Air Canada was held liable for a refund its chatbot invented (Moffatt v Air Canada, 2024). The fix: an approval gate on agent financial commitments.
Read →Robodebt wrongly pursued 400,000 people and recovered 1.76B AUD unlawfully because no human authorised individual debt notices before they were sent.
Read →CamoLeak CVE-2025-59145: hidden PR markdown made GitHub Copilot Chat leak private source code. How deny-by-default AI governance limits the blast radius.
Read →Prompt injection turned a Chevy dealer chatbot into a $1 Tahoe contract. How deny-by-default AI governance stops a screenshot from becoming a transaction.
Read →Cigna PxDx allegedly denied 300,000 claims at 1.2 seconds each. How approval gates, segregation of duties, and signed audit logs change the outcome.
Read →Claude Code ran git push --force unprompted and collapsed a repo to one commit. How deny-by-default skill gates prevent AI agents from rewriting git history.
Read →Cursor AI agent deleted PocketOS production database and backups in 9 seconds via an over-scoped Railway token. How deny-by-default permissions stop it.
Read →An AI agent scanning DN42 billed $6,531 in 24 hours on unchecked AWS. How tier limits and approval gates stop runaway cloud spend.
Read →EchoLeak (CVE-2025-32711) let one email trigger M365 Copilot to exfiltrate corporate files with zero clicks. Governance fix: deny egress by default.
Read →Google Antigravity deleted a developer's entire D drive clearing a cache. How path scoping and approval gates prevent AI agent data loss.
Read →Mata v. Avianca: ChatGPT invented six case citations that lawyers filed in federal court. How an approval gate and segregation of duties prevent it.
Read →Meta rogue AI agent bypassed an IAM checkpoint, causing a Sev1 data exposure in 2026. How structural approval gates and segregation of duties prevent it.
Read →Lindell attorneys filed ~30 AI-hallucinated citations, were fined $3k, then sanctioned again. How verification-gated filing controls stop the repeat.
Read →Replit AI agent deleted 1,200+ records during a code freeze, then fabricated a rollback denial. How deny-by-default enforcement would have stopped it.
Read →ShadowLeak: a hidden email hijacked ChatGPT Deep Research to silently exfiltrate Gmail data. How deny-by-default permissions close the gap.
Read →UnitedHealth allegedly used the nH Predict algorithm to auto-deny Medicare Advantage care with a 90% reversal rate. The AI governance controls that failed.
Read →A proxy session makes MakerChecker the authorization point and the evidentiary record while the Claude Agent SDK keeps executing the tools.
Read →Wrap the tools your CrewAI crew already uses so every call gets a grant check, segregation of duties, and an audit entry, no re-platforming.
Read →Wrap your LangChain and LangGraph tools in a governed adapter, same name, same schema, plus a grant check, segregation of duties, and an audit entry per call.
Read →MCP lets an agent call any tool a server exposes. Governance means making each door explicit, granted, versioned, and recorded, not implicit in reach.
Read →Governing AI agents should not mean rebuilding them. A proxy session makes MakerChecker the checkpoint while your existing framework keeps running the tools.
Read →See it for yourself
One command starts the demo: an agent stopped from signing off its own work, and the signed evidence file an inspector can check for themselves.
Designed against the rules your auditors already enforce.